O’Hanlon, 2010. “The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Security in Asia.”

Umemoto, 2010. “Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and the U.S.-Japan Alliance.”

The two articles argue that the innovation of the military technics and its deployment might not necessarily weaken the following re-alignment of the alliance cooperation. To maximize the defense capability of the alliance, it is important to deepen the mutual consultant and intelligence sharing. In the case of US-JP alliance, to maintain the necessary number of US forces in Japan is still critical.

O’Hanlon takes a skeptical perspective to examine the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA). While proponents of RMA argues the importance to introduce RMA program to focus the budget more on innovation of the military technics and thus less on military operation, training and readiness, in order to save money, O’Hanlon points out that developing a ripe technology application per se is expansive before it can be deployed into real practices; radical innovation is not always good and radical development could prove wrong; the current military planning has already taken incrementalism in adapting military innovation without the need to declare RMA program.

O’Hanlon and Umemoto take TMD an example of introducing new military technology in military deployment. The strategic significance of deploying TMD/BMD is to reduce threat from North Korea and China. Both of the authors argue that the deployment of TMD/BMD in Japan could contribute to intercept missiles from North Korea and China. Umemoto also mentions the small but possible threat from Russian missile in case of that the U.S. deploys national missile defense with intercontinental capability. Umemoto also mentions that, if Japan deploys BMD, South Korea might be wary of the strengthened capability of Japanese military, and a reunified Korea with BMD and nuclear warhead of its own might become a threat to Japan. Both O’Hanlon and Umemoto regard China’s ambition to be superior in East Asia and to control Taiwan would be a challenge to U.S.-Japan alliance so that China would deter Japan from assisting the U.S.’ involvement in the affairs of Taiwan Strait and, furthermore, deter the U.S. from involving. They argue that the deployment of the BMD would help the allies not to rule out but to maintain the choice whether to involve in Taiwan Strait or not.

However, O’Hanlon and Umemoto also point out the shortages of the deployment of TMD/BMD in Japan. First, TMD/BMD is not a leakproof protection system. Second, it could provoke arms races among U.S.-Japan, North Korea, China, and Russia. An arms

race would neutralize the benefit of deployment of TMD/BMD, and, worse, threat Japanese security more than when Japan has never deployed TMD/BMD. In order to make the deployment of TMD/BMD worth, it is important to improve diplomatic and security relations with Russia and South Korea by deepen mutual consultations. In case of North Korea, Japan could try to recover the diplomatic ties with it. In case of China, since China would be strategically potential rival with Japan and the U.S. in term of its ambition in East Asia, it would be relatively difficult to build mutual confidence and the like with it, however, the deployment of TMD/BMD in Japan could become the bargaining tool for U.S.-Japan to negotiate with China, encourage it to engage in disarmament, regional tension reduction, and, last, confidence building.

In the aspect of the impact of introducing new technology into military deployment on the alliance relations, O'Hanlon points out that over-asymmetric military development between the allies would weaken the alliance cooperation, such as the problems in interoperability between the allies, that the allies would give up to keep up with the development of the U.S., and that the isolationist sentiments would arise among the Americans when the U.S. faces fiscal problem.

For the solutions to such problems, O'Hanlon suggests that the U.S. could coordinate the purchasing of the technologies of the U.S. for its allies in order to minimize their spending and maximize the value of the new purchase. Instead, the allies could also choose to accept the U.S. Marine Corps in order to directly introduce the forces capable to operate and equipped with the new technologies.

Although the introducing of new tech into the allies, more specifically TMD/BMD in Japan, would potentially imply the reduction of military presence of the U.S., both O'Hanlon and Umemoto suggest it is still necessary for both the U.S. and Japan to maintain U.S. forces in Japan. O'Hanlon argues that, even with new technology deployed in Japan or other allies, the U.S. would still need forward bases to maintain air superiority in specific region, because most of the airplanes still remain short range. The U.S. would also need ground forces deployed in the region, too, in order to be capable to seize or hold territory and surveillances. Such tacks would be hard to be replaced by sensors, because of the limitation of the physics.

Thus, both O'Hanlon and Umemoto argues the necessity of the U.S. Marine to be deployed in Okinawa, although the number of it could be reduced. Umemoto also further suggests that the military presence of the U.S. in Japan would bolster the

credibility of U.S. nuclear umbrella covering Japan, which would provide complement to the TMD/BMD deployed in Japan. Umemoto also suggests greater integration of equipment and operation of SDFs and the U.S. forces as the military realignment incorporated with the deployment of TMD/BMD in Japan. For example, In order to maximize the capability of the missile defense, the U.S. and Japan could incorporate their C3I (command, control, communication, intelligence) structure together. These potential development should be part of the strengthening mutual consultation between the U.S. and Japan, in order to deepen their political-security ties. For Japan, it is important to revise the interpretation of the constitution in the right of collective self-defense and of the principles of weaponry exportation, in order to better practice the interoperation and integration between the U.S. and Japan forces.